



## Islam in Asian and African Countries Ислам в странах Азии и Африки

DOI [10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550](https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550)

УДК 94(23.57)«19/20»+28:316.3

ВАК 07.00.03

### Change of social protest in Pakistan: class forms versus religious forms

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**Abstract:** Social protest in the East, in particular in Pakistan, is today one of the most vibrant research topics. It has become the focal point due to the acute social discontent that has engulfed many states around the world, first and foremost, the Near and Middle East. To this one can add radical protests and the recourse to terror as means to achieve the goals set. With its 200 million population Pakistan is one of the largest state of the world. It is located at the place where the South Asia meets the Western and Central Asia. Historically, Pakistan belongs to South Asia and Hindustan, however, from the point of view of its culture it is closely associated with the world of Islam that of Arabia and the Turkic and Iranian worlds. From the point of the international politics Pakistan is equally rather important. To its importance contribute the everlasting hostility with neighboring India, possession of nuclear weapons as well as a deep and organic connection with the neighbouring Afghanistan and the large percentage of people who think in terms of what it called the extremist Islamism. In the vast number of research articles and monographs published both in Russia and abroad surprisingly very little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of the social protest and its forms, which is indeed quite significant in the history of the Pakistani state. Chronologically one can identify two major periods. The first period commences in 1947 and ends up in 1970s. This period has been marked by the so-called “class protest”. Its driving forces was the peasants, the working class and the students. The protests were either spontaneous or well organized; they were linked to the left-wing and secularist political groups and parties as well as intellectuals, liberal democrats or left-wing communists. The second period were marked by the harsh state suppression of the opposition on one hand-side and strengthening of the right-wing, religious radicalism. This dichotomy invites a preliminary conclusion that that mass protest in Pakistan underwent significant changes from the “class forms” to the socio-religious ones.

**Keywords:** Islam; maoism; Pakistan; the social protest; USSR; Z. A. Bhutto; A. A. Maududi

**For citation:** Belokrenitsky V. Ya. Change of social protest in Pakistan: class forms versus religious forms. *Minbar. Islamic Studies*. 2018;11(3):537–550. (In Russ.) DOI: [10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550](https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550).



## Социальный протест в Пакистане: от классовых форм к религиозным

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**Аннотация:** социальный протест на Востоке, в частности в Пакистане, является сегодня одной из самых актуальных и востребованных тем. Ввиду понятного интереса к причинам острого социального недовольства, охватившего многие государства мира, в первую очередь Ближнего и Среднего Востока, а также к процессам радикализации там протестных настроений, распространению террористических методов борьбы с властью и ее ответных репрессий, расползанию, подобно раковой опухоли, зон брожения и небезопасности. Пакистан является крупнейшим по населению государством мира (6-е место, примерно 200 млн жителей), находящимся на стыке Южной, Западной и Центральной Азии. Исторически он принадлежит Южной Азии, Индостану, а культурно и цивилизационно связан с исламским миром, как арабским, так и тюрко-иранским. Международно-политическое его значение определяется рядом факторов, среди которых вражда с соседней Индией, обладание ядерным оружием, глубокая и органичная связь с обстановкой в Афганистане, участие государства в «войне с глобальным терроризмом» и распространение на его территории крупных очагов экстремистского исламизма. В достаточно обширной отечественной и еще более значительной мировой историографии по проблемам Пакистана сюжету о формах социального протеста и динамике их изменений уделено, как ни странно, недостаточно внимания. Между тем, роль и место этого социального явления велики, а определение предмета исследования, на первый взгляд, не представляется затруднительным. Если посмотреть на почти уже 70-летнюю историю существования государства Пакистан, то легко увидеть резко различающиеся этапы в характере, формах и движущих силах массового протеста, перемены во внутренних и внешних причинах, действовавших на него. Предварительно можно выделить два крупных периода, на которые распадется история массовых протестов населения. Первый включает начальные десятилетия, более четверти века существования страны с момента образования в 1947 г. до середины–конца 1970-х гг. В эти годы социальный протест носил, как представляется, в основном классовый характер, и выражался в выступлениях рабочего класса и крестьянства, а также студенчества и средних городских слоев. Они протекали как в стихийной, так и в организованной форме и нередко были связаны с левыми и секуляристскими политическими группами и партиями, интеллектуальными кругами либерально-демократического или лево-коммунистического толка. Второй период, не закончившийся до сих пор, ознаменовался жестким подавлением государством оппозиционных рабочих, крестьянских и профсоюзных движений, усилением правого религиозного радикализма, захватом им антиправительственной «площадки». Можно в качестве гипотезы предположить, что массовый протест в Пакистане от социально-классовых форм эволюционировал в сторону социально-религиозных.

**Ключевые слова:** ислам; З. А. Бхутто; Зия уль-Хак; маоизм; А. А. Маудуди; Пакистан; Пакистанская Народная Партия; социальный протест; СССР

**Для цитирования:** Белокреницкий В. Я. Социальный протест в Пакистане: от классовых форм к религиозным. *Minbar. Islamic Studies*. 2018;11(3):537–550. DOI: [10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550](https://doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2018-11-3-537-550).



## Cold war and the class protest

The division of colonial India into two independent states brought many changes to the historical regions that later formed the state of Pakistan. The type of society, which continued to exist after India got its independence was marked by a certain unity of both population and culture as well as politics and economics. Contrary to that the state of Pakistan was freshly formed within the boundaries, which previously did never exist [1]. The state of Pakistan itself came into existence when the Cold War started between two blocks of countries, which differ both politically and ideologically. The formation of the Pakistan socio-political structure was influenced and shaped by the unfolding struggle between the so-called free world and the communist world for ideological and political domination and influence on the states that had been recently freed from colonialism.

As the most important moment in this process can be considered the Communist Party of India's decision to send some of its leaders to Pakistan in order to form or build the Communist Party of Pakistan. It was established in February 1948 at the first Communist congress in Calcutta, namely on the territory of India. In the early 1950s, the Communist Party of Pakistan split into two independent organizations operating in Western and Eastern Pakistan [2, p. 249]. It should be noted here that Muslims did constitute a significant part within the KPI leadership. In 1942–1945, when the leadership of the Indian National Congress, headed by M. Gandhi and J. Neru, refused to cooperate with the Anglo-Indian authorities, the KPI in supporting the USSR anti-fascist struggle enjoyed a certain freedom of actions in India. In a resolution proposed in 1943 by the new secretary of the KPI, P. Ch. Joshi, supported the movement, which was aimed to the formation of Pakistan, interpreting this act as the realization the nations' right for self-determination. The pro-Pakistani stance of the communists contributed to the growth of their influence among the peasants in Punjab (the core of the future country), where the Unionist party was indeed against it. In such a way the Unionist party did reflect and express the interests of the land owners. Some communists from Punjab, such as D. Latifi worked closely with the members of the local branch of the All-India Muslim League (IML) and took active part in the drafting of the manifesto of the Punjabi League organization for the elections of 1945 and 1946 [3, p. 64–65]. At the same time, the communists tried to make to the pro Pakistan creation movement headed by the IML and, in particular, M. A. Jinnah more populist/socialist in appealing to the consciousness of the peasants and the lower classes of the urban population.

After the formation of the state of Pakistan, the paths of the Communists and the Muslim League went apart. The communists although became a subject to political oppression, but nevertheless they have preserved a certain influence on the masses and the socio-political groups as well. In particular, the communist presence was visible in the governing trade unions in Punjab, in the first instance the union of railway workers. The Communists also enjoyed great influence in the local peasant unions. Left-wing politicians headed such a massive peasant organization of Sind (another



major province in the Western Pakistan) as the *Hari Committee* [4, p. 178–189]. In the early 1950s, after in a number of provinces was adopted a legislation, which limited the landowners' land tenure by allotting the landless and land-poor peasants with the land, which belonged to the State, etc. there has been some decline in the mass movement. The communists and left-wing forces received a blow by a well-known legal process, which later became known as the "Rawalpindi conspiracy" [5, p. 24–25]. Some prominent military leaders, officials and left-wing liberal intellectuals who expressed the pro-communist views were convicted in preparing a coup d'état. Among them was the future laureate of the Lenin Peace Prize (1970), a popular poet and one of the spiritual leaders of the country, F.A. Faiz [6, p. 196–201]. The persecution of the Communists continued also in the future, as Pakistan was drawn into the orbit of US foreign policy in Asia and the Middle East. It was not by chance that, subsequent to Pakistan signed an agreement on mutual assistance in defense with the United States on May 19, 1954, the Communist Parties were banned in East Pakistan (July 5) as well as West Pakistan (July 24) [2, p. 249].

Mass actions of workers, members of trade unions and peasants continued, however, they expressed economical rather than political demands [4, p. 181–189]. From the mid-1950s onwards the role of the army in establishing order in major cities has noticeably increased. At the beginning of 1953, martial law was first introduced in Lahore, and the need for such a step was caused not by threats from the left-wing politicians but the right-wing political forces [7, p. 207–208; 8, p. 37–38].

The role of the religious opposition in greater detail will be discussed below, however, at this place one must point out to the fact that up to the second half of the 1970s the left-wing and the right-wing activists sometimes cooperated with each other. After in 1958 the martial law was first introduced in the country and the military circles lead by M. Ayub Khan came to power the activity of all political forces was banned. In 1962, political activity was allowed again, however, the ban on the Communist party was not lifted as well as some prominent political leaders of the center and right-wing were denied the right to take part in the elections in running for the seat in the Parliament. The discrimination of both left and right-wing political forces and their leaders did contribute to the fact that in the presidential elections in 1965, the left and right-wing organizations together supported an Ayub Khan's rival, F. Jinnah who was the sister of the founder of the State of Pakistan. The victory of Field Marshal Ayub Khan was, though indisputable, however, not too convincing and was considered as a bad omen of the deep political crisis, which came in the late 1968 – early 1969. During the anti-government movements at that time the class and the so-called "progressive"<sup>1</sup> nature of social protest was rather well articulated and the protesters were to their major part University students.

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<sup>1</sup> One has to stress here the use of the label "progressive" as applied to the leftist and democratic ideological move-ments. Thus in 1947 in Pakistan there was an Association of the "progressive" (tarakipassand in Urdu) writers. It was banned in 1954, however, as a literary movement the "progressivism" retains its influence until 1980ies [2, p. 493–494].



Student manifestations in Pakistan at that time did coincide with student unrest in France and other Western European countries. The reason, as is often in such case, were some restrictions, which local authorities imposed on the students of one of the prestigious university colleges in Rawalpindi (the then temporary capital). The violent reaction of the young people as well as the middle-class representatives provoked a number of solidarity actions. They were subsequently used by political forces who opposed the military-parliamentary regime. The attempt of the authorities to reach an agreement with political opponents failed largely due to the massive support, which the opposition received from students, workers and trade union organizations. In mid-February, at the call of these organizations, a mass strike (*hartal*), i.e. the suspension of all activities took place in the country, which in turn resulted in the fact that the troops were brought into some cities in order to restore law and order [9, p. 264–265].

Here one has to repeat again that the social protest in Pakistan at that time was in a way similar to those, which followed the end of the WWII in the post-colonial countries. Outside the USA in the capitalist world the leftist sentiments continued to be widely spread and the communist parties and movements were strong enough. At that time in Pakistan the political scene entered the young generation, which was born after the country gained its independence. These people had an opportunity to become professionals, to continue their studies abroad and widen their horizons. Among them there were quite a few enthusiasts who were raised on the anti-colonialist ideas and believed in social justice and considered the political struggle as an instrument for improving life for the people.

Such sentiments caused a certain unity among the top members of the student political movement on one hand and the workers and peasants on the other. To these unity did contribute various political parties not only the “traditional” (as those which came to fruition when the political activity in Pakistan became allowed) but also the left-democratic parties, such as the National People’s Party (NPP) and the newly established populist organizations, such as the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP). The latter was established at the end of 1967 on the initiative and under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto, the former foreign minister of Pakistan who originated from the class of Sind’s big landowners. This social background, however, did not prevent Bhutto from consolidating around him the left-wing intellectuals, as well as supporters of secular and Islamic socialism. They helped to draft the Party’s program and subsequently to take part in the elections of 1970. Among the popular demands of the PPP was the so called “*roti, kapra va makan*” (i.e. bread, clothing and housing”). The party won the parliamentary elections in the Western part of the country by receiving about two-thirds of the deputy mandates (81 out of 138). After the division of the country into Bangladesh and Pakistan a year after the elections, the party of Z. A. Bhutto formed the largest faction in parliament and following the Constitution of 1973, became the ruling party.



Under Z.A. Bhutto the Cabinet of Ministers pursued an ambivalent social policy. On the one hand, it supported the left-wing populist demands for the nationalization of large private enterprises, banks and companies. On the other hand, however, it made every effort to weaken the unity and influence of trade union associations, workers' unions and peasant organizations<sup>2</sup>. Already in 1972, in the first year of his service Z. A. Bhutto simultaneously gave a blow to the class opponents on the right, i.e. the city bankers and entrepreneurs, and on the left, i.e. working-class people. To defeat the first group Z. A. Bhutto used nationalization without payment of compensation and prosecution, then against the latter, a ban on strikes, especially in state enterprises, a refusal to recognize collective agreements concluded independently by unions with the employers. As a result of the nationalization of key sectors of the economy the state (or more precisely, the tip of the bureaucracy), had taken the role and function of a corporate entrepreneur.

Trying to continue the initiative, which looked like the left-wing policy the government declared the 1<sup>st</sup> of May to be a non-working day, announced an increase in the minimum wage, the number of days off per year and the amount of severance payments [1, p. 250, 252]. The ruling party also sought to keep the workers demonstrations under their slogans<sup>3</sup> and<sup>4</sup> the trade-unions leaders. At the same time the Z. A. Bhutto's government tried at the same time to reduce the social protest, which was further diminished by the military regime that subsequently replaced it.

### **The defeat of the left forces and the Islamization of social protest**

The repressive measures of the military against the workers' organizations and left-wing parties began immediately after the transition period between the military coup d'état in the summer of 1977 and the consolidation of power in the autumn of the same year. At the end of September, the former Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto was charged with organizing a political assassination, and the head of the army headquarters, M. Zia-ul-Haq, refused as he promised earlier to hold new parliamentary elections and postponed them for two years. The restrictive measures were taken by the military authorities against the pro-Bhutto supporters and left-wing politicians in general. The strikes had to be stopped as well as all other workers' attempts to make demands to the owners of enterprises and businesses. The shooting of workers' strikers on January 2, 1978 in Multan (a large city in the southern part of Punjab), was a landmark. It made apparent that the military authorities are not only on the side of entrepreneurs, but also are ready to use weapons against those who encroach

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<sup>2</sup> Z. A. Bhutto recalls the difficulties he had to face to prevent the "face" of his political party when in March 1970 in a small Punjab town of Tobateksingh was successfully held a congress (kisan) of the Peasant party. This congress, however, was organized not by his party see: [3, p. 80–83].

<sup>3</sup> The author of these lines was witnessing the demonstration of the PPP activists and representatives of other parties in Lahor on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1975. In the lorries were sitting people who looked like workers. They held red banners and the red-green-white flags of the PPP.

<sup>4</sup> This aspect of the PPP policy was a subject of many researches. See more recently: [3, p. 92–93].



on the rights of private property [4, p. 111]. In October 1979, Zia-ul-Haq, who became a president by that time, announced a ban on political activity and confirmed the decision that made it impossible to strike. Using the previously existing law on vitally important industries and services, the military deprived the workers and the employees of all channels of social protest.

As a result of prohibitions and targeted repression, the previously very active trade unions of railway workers, harbour workers, media specialists, the post office and telegraph office workers, could not hold a single mass action during the years of military rule. Repressions against the left-wing opposition are well documented. Based on reports of the Pakistani press, official documents and reports of international organizations, Pakistani economist O. Noman calculated that for political activity in 1977–1985 a total of about 20 thousand people were subject to various penalties<sup>5</sup>. Among them, besides activists of political parties, there was a large number of trade unionists and workers leaders. The ban on trade union activities in these years was in fact combined with emigration, which was often actually the flight of skilled workers and engineers who headed mainly to the rich oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf. The shortage of skilled workforce led to an increase in real wages in Pakistani industry and caused workers' lack of interest to the trade union struggle.

The position of workers and trade union organizations was slightly improved after the parliamentary elections held in early 1985, albeit on a non-political party, and the triumphant return to the country in April 1986 of Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the executed on the unsubstantiated charge in 1979 former prime minister. She headed the former ruling party, which tried to restore its position among the employees, workers and peasants [10]. However, this was far from being easy due to the above-mentioned trends and the "change of generations" among the activists of the workers as well as trade union members. Largely due to the generation gap the attempt to revive the Association of Progressive Writers became also unsuccessful. In addition, although some leaders of the PPP were among those affected by the harassment of the military authorities (B. Bhutto, in particular, spent several months in a solitary confinement cell), however, most of them, being members of the upper class did manage to avoid reprisals. Others started to collaborate with the authorities and the party itself did nothing to help the left opposition, which operated in the cities of Punjab and Karachi, as well as activists of trade unions<sup>6</sup>.

The strongest PPP positions were in rural areas of Sindh. There in the second half of 1983 were held a series of mass rallies and demonstrations against the policy

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<sup>5</sup> Cited after [3, p. 180].

<sup>6</sup> The situation in many businesses and enterprises practically deteriorated in the mid 1980s. The authorities who were afraid of the workers' movements supported the businesses and enterprises owners and took their part. This allowed the owners to close many trade unions, which were opposed to their policies or completely replace them, whereas the employees were deprived of any legal and social support and protection. See: IAR. Thrice cursed. Her-ald. 1986;(November):81–82.



of the military regime. The bulk of the participants were poor peasants and powerless tenants, who, as a rule, were led by the leaders from the landowning nobility. The authorities considered these actions to be an uprising, supported from abroad (presumably from India) and redeployed military units to quell the insurgency. The fight against opposition actions as well of those of the parties that united in the PPP-led Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was accompanied by numerous victims and ended only in early 1984 [1, p. 322].

The defeat of the forces of social protest, both peasant and secular in form as well as from the urban milieu, was carried out by the military authorities and accompanied by the rise of the right-wing protest movement in Islamic “clad”. As has already been noted above, up until the end of the 1970s, clerical organizations had not yet “shunned” to politically build a block with moderately leftist forces. At the same time, they fiercely competed with the left radicals in their attempt to influence students, workers and peasants.

From the first years of Pakistan’s existence, the leading party of the pro-Islamic trend was the *Jamaat-e Islam* (the JI or Islamic Society) led by the prominent theorist of Islamism A. A. Maududi. Having moved from India to Pakistan in 1948, he became a fundamentalist and fought against the *Ahmadiyya* liberal sect, requesting it to be recognized as the non-Islamic one. The unrest caused by the JI anti-*Ahmadiyya* movements served as the basis for his subsequent conviction to death punishment in 1953. After spending several years in prison and finally pardoned by the authorities, A. A. Maududi resumed his activities, trying to build a “party of the Leninist type”. A. A. Maududi was thought to have been impressed by the model of the Bolshevik party, about which he could have learned from the Pakistan communists. He was attracted by the obligatory participation of members of the organization in party work, the presence of a professional personnel core, and democratic centralism in decision-making. He tried, therefore, to adopt the leftist principles of party building. As he was annoyed with the success of the Peasant Conference of 1970 already mentioned above, he in contrast to it, organized his own rally in Lahore [3, pp. 42, 66, 84].

Despite the failure of the 1970 elections (the JI got there four seats, and other religious-political parties, 14), the Islamists in the 1970s gradually gained the initiative in organizing mass events. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), formed in early 1977 on the eve of the second election, aimed to prevent the ruling PPP and the authoritarian Premier Bhutto from winning. This Alliance united all the main parties, including the moderately left-wing National People’s Party, however, the electoral slogans remained predominantly Islamic. This hinted the JI influence as well as its sponsors, including foreign ones (according to widespread rumors from Saudi Arabia). It is not surprising, therefore, that after usurping power in July 1977, the military used the Islamists, primarily from the JI, as a cover for their dictatorship. Representatives of the JI and other pro-Islamic parties (in Urdu *islampasands*, i.e. Islam-loving) became part of the interim Cabinet under the allegiance in August





1978. They developed the theoretical foundations of the Islamization program, which was painstakingly carried on by Zia-ul-Haq after issuing the ban on political activity in October 1979, and the resignation of Islamist ministers. By that time, A. A. Maududi was no longer alive, and the *Jamaat Islam* was headed by the less charismatic M. Tufail. The mutual alienation of the military and the Islamists was, however, not complete and did not immediately become apparent. But it still grew, and in early 1984, Zia-ul-Haq announced the ban on political activities on university campuses (student accommodations). By this decree, the military dictator defeated the strongest (by that time) student religious political organization, the *Islami Jamiat Tulab* (IJT, Islamic Student Society).

Creating the IJT can be considered one of the most successful projects of the A. A. Maududi Party. In the first decades of Pakistan's history, left-wing student organizations were rather influential. Although the communists did not have time to penetrate and root into the student milieu, the general situation in the world still favored progressive, anti-imperialist sentiments. From the mid-1960s, after Pakistan came close to the PRC, Marxist and Maoist literature from China began to flow freely into the Pakistani book market. This increased the attractiveness of the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong for young people and understandably intensified the concern of the Islamists. Before that, in their propaganda the Islamists focused on the rejection of colonialism, modernism and imperialism. In some aspects their positions coincided with those of the left and left-liberal circles. The growing popularity among students and intellectuals of the ideas of socialism and communism, mainly of the Chinese type, forced the JI and its youth wing to shift the emphasis on criticism of socialism. Since the 1960s, the IJT has begun an active struggle against leftist and liberal organizations. In addition to aggressive agitation, members of the IJT often resorted to sophisticated and violent methods of struggle and were able to lead the majority of students at major universities [3, p. 73–74]. In the first period after Zia-ul-Haq came to power, the military fully supported the IJT, however, the ban on political activity caused discontent among students. The "Islamization from above" conducted by the authorities also did not fully correspond to their expectations. Hence, the appeals of the Islamist students to end with the military situation, which caused the above-mentioned retaliatory measures by the general-president. At the same time, complete disengagement from the Islamists did not meet the interests of the military leadership. Islamic moods served as an authoritarianism pillar. The signal from the IJT, as well as some other factors and circumstances, in particular, the resistance of society to direct dictatorship and pressure from the United States, dissatisfied with rude methods of rule, forced Zia-ul-Haq to take the path of transforming military rule into the civil-military one [1, p. 323–326].

In harness with the work on the student front, the Islamists from the JI campaigned among the workers as well as within the trade union movement. They began to be especially active and successful in the late 1970s, in the wake of the general rise in pro-Islamic sentiments. Under the control of the JI came one of the



most powerful trade union associations, the National Labor Federation, as well as the trade unions of leading state-owned enterprises and companies, such as the Pakistan Metallurgical Plant, built with the help of the USSR, the Office for Water Resources and Energy, nationalized banks, etc. [1, p. 88]. It should be emphasized here that by the end of the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, the forms of manifestation of social protest had changed. The mass demonstrations of workers essentially ceased due to the workers, trade unions and peasant unions have lost their power. Liberal student organizations and associations of progressive-minded intellectuals, professors, doctors and lawyers, have given way to conservative-minded circles and Muslim theologians (*ulama*).

In addition to domestic political reasons, this was also due to the new situation in the economy. Pakistan's indirect participation in the war of the Afghan Mujahideen (fighters for the faith) against the government and Soviet troops in Afghanistan helped the authorities to pursue a liberal foreign trade course. The flow of imported consumer goods caused a crisis in some leading branches of Pakistan's manufacturing industry and slowed the pace of industrial growth. The increase in urban unemployment has spurred labor migration abroad. Many activists and leaders of the workers movement went there. The relatively high earnings of labor migrants allowed them to transfer part of the money home, where it was invested in the domestic economy. The transfer of funds from abroad through private channels has become a serious factor, which did not affect the foundations of the society [11; 12].

After the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash in August 1988 (which has not been disclosed until now), a new phase of the political history of Pakistan began. It can be called the period of electoral democracy. It was interrupted by the military *coup d'état* of 1999, but the emergency regime was mild and short-termed, ending with the 2002 parliamentary elections. These were followed by the elections of 2008 and 2013. Social protest was transformed for the most part into a political one and was directed not against power as such, but against abuse of power. As a rule it had a livery of the leading opposition parties. It became more active especially before the elections and immediately after them. At the same time, the protest was conducted not so much under positive slogans of the struggle for the social guarantees, political freedoms and improvement of living conditions, but under negative ones, such as the struggle against violations of personal and public rights and freedoms, against corruption, nepotism and social injustice the rampant terrorism. etc.

### **Ethnic separatism and religious particularism**

Mass social protest recently manifested itself, moreover, in strengthening ethnic (or tribal) separatism and religious particularism. Separatist tendencies appeared simultaneously with the formation of the state of Pakistan. The most serious attempts are those undertaken by the rulers of the Baluchistan principality of Kalat, who headed the confederation of smaller principalities and tribal unions, not to recognize the legitimacy of Baluchistan's joining the state of Pakistan [13, p. 195–197].



Additionally, supporters of a charismatic Pashtun mullah Fakir from Ipi who settled on the Afghan border proclaimed the creation of Free Pushtunistan and in this capacity received support from Kabul [14, p. 90–91]. These separatist tendencies did not stop. The Baluchi separatism came to its climax in the mid-1970s. The government headed by Z. A. Bhutto was opposed by his recent allies from the National People's Party and the *Jamiat-e ulama-e Islam* who in 1972–73 was at the top of the Baluchistan administration as well as that of the North-West Frontier Province. The leaders of the NPP were representatives of the Baluchi tribal nobility, and after their arrest, some local tribes (e.g. *marry*, *mengal*, etc.) resisted the National army who advanced into the province. The fighting took place in 1974–77 and resulted in a death of around 9000 people [15, p. 226; 16, p. 100]. The peace eventually took place only after the power change in Islamabad and lasted until 2003. The new conflict between the Bugti tribe and the central government followed the dispute over the rent gained from natural gas production at the country's largest natural gas deposit in Sui, located in the tribe's territory. The acrimonious confrontation took place in 2005–06 and ended with the death of the Bugti leader Akbar Khan a Pakistan prominent state and political figure of the national level.

It should be emphasized here that the armed clashes were only the tip of the iceberg of the Baluchi separatism. Its "underwater" part was on one hand the conservative leaders and elders of the largest and most isolated tribal groups, and on the other, the urban middle class, tradesmen and businessmen, students and the "intelligentsia". Some evidences say that after 2006 the opposition sentiments are seen in provincial cities there is a shift of balance balance from the interior territories to the Makran coast [17, p. 8–10].

Until the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Baluchi separatism from the point of view of ideology had a secular or even a leftist character. However, in recent decades, this movement has shifted to the right and became closer to radical religious movements. A prominent place among the Baluchi opposition organizations was taken by *Jundallah* (Army of Allah), a secret group of militant Sunnis. The organization's ideological leadership is believed to be located in Karachi, where the Baluchi diaspora has settled long ago. The Jundalla's opponents among others are the leadership of Pakistan and Iran. The group's activities thus fit into the local conflict between the Sunnis and Shia, which took its origin in 1980s in Pakistan [18].

Similar changes has undergone Pashtun separatism. For a long time, ideologically, it was represented by left-wing liberals and secular people. The founder of the modern nationalism of the Pashtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan was Gaffar Khan who ideologically was close to Mahatma Gandhi and similarly proclaimed the non-violence in achieving of political goals. This was a basic principle of the National People's Party, which in the 1960s and 1980s was headed by his son and later by his grandson Asfandiyar Khan. The secular Pashtuns in the late twentieth century were overcome by the Islamist groups first known as the



Mujahideen, and since the mid-1990s, as the Taliban (those who seek genuine knowledge). After the invasion of the US-NATO troops and the defeat of the Taliban regime in 2001 the struggle between various groups of Islamists in Afghanistan spread over to Pakistan. It became instrumental in the emergence of local Taliban organizations, mainly in the mountainous areas [1]. They can be viewed mainly as ethno-tribal and nationalist movements, although they often declare themselves close to the Islamist “Chaliphate” movement and fight against the entire system of modern state and international order.

Along with the Islamization of ethnic nationalism in Pakistan in recent decades, there has been a rise of religious maximalism and particularism. The Zia ul-Haq Islamization policy caused a rift between the majority of Muslims of the Sunni Hanafi *madhhab* and the Shiite minority. Since the Sunni Hanafi practices did dominate in the local jurisprudence the Shia mass demonstrations took part in the capital of Islamabad and other major cities in 1980. The Shia population demanded the rights to follow their own rules for Islamic world order. The radical representatives of both movements started eventually a civil war. The peak of the bloody clashes between Sunni and Shia took part in the second half of the 1990s. Mass actions were often a response to the decisions and actions of the state authorities as, for example, in the beginning of 1998. Then the centre of Lahore was held for three days by violent people who were angry because of the mass shooting at a Shiite cemetery. Then and later such actions paralyzed the life in the city of Karachi and other cities [19, p. 432].

In the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the authorities managed to somewhat lessen the clashes between the Sunnis and Shia in the main centre of their settlement, the province of Punjab. However, it was followed by the Sunni attacks on the Shia Hazara who came from Afghanistan and have re-settled in Quetta the main city of Baluchistan. Militant Sunni attacks on Hazaras always caused mass protests in Karachi, Islamabad and other major cities. Along with Shia authorities they were headed also by human rights organizations who accused the Pakistani authorities of inability to implement the safety and protect their citizens<sup>7</sup>.

Mass protests in modern Pakistan are also provoked by the terrorist acts, which follow the struggle between the rivalling theologians from the Sunni schools of *Deobandi* and *Barelvi*. The sectarianism in Islam caused the emergence of numerous groups and organizations consisting of prominent theologians (*ulama*) and their followers. One of such groups the *Minhaj-ul-Islam*, organized peaceful political mass demonstrations in early 2013, which took part again in July-September of the next year. Its leader, the theologian T. ul-Qadri, joined forces with the popular politician an ex-athlete Imran Khan. Acting jointly, the I. Khan’s party the *Tehreek-e Insaf* (Movement for Justice) and the *Minhaj ul-Islam* were later transformed into the *Pakistan Avamee Tehreek* (Pakistani People’s Movement). This organisation managed

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<sup>7</sup> In February 2013 the author of these lines witnessed the mass protest in Karachi as it became known about the Quetta murder. The contrast between the Lahore demonstration in 1975 (see note 14) and the Karachi demonstration (40 years after) was drastic.



peacefully to paralyze life in the capital of the country and forced the government to partially implement its demands and requirements. It is important to stress that the organized social protest had in this case a pronounced religious form, which, however, was not of a radical, militant character.

## Conclusion

A number of evidences as above has proven the initial thesis about the cardinal changes of the phenomenon of the social protest in the 70 years history of Pakistan. At the first stage (up to the 1970s) the protest was caused by disagreement with the socio-economic and foreign policy which the authorities did stick to. The protest itself was influenced by the left-wing, Marxist and Maoist ideology, where (until the 1960) the USSR served as a positive example, and subsequently the People's Republic of China. An important role in the life of the then Pakistani society was played by various class organizations. These were in the first instance the trade unions of workers and employees, as well as professional unions, which were influenced by various political parties. Mass actions were carried out mainly under economic slogans. In addition to the workers unions, there were also peasant unions that came forward with their calls and demands too. Similarly, a prominent role was played by student associations and groups of intellectuals.

At the second stage, which continues today, social protest is formed under the influence of other internal and external factors. The extinction of socialist ideas gave rise to a crisis in the workers 'and peasants' movement, left-wing student organizations and intellectual circles. The retrograde outlook and archaic ideals came to the forefront. The main axis of the world opposition has influenced the opposition forces, which are now chiefly represented by the right-wing and centre movements. Financially they rely on the moral and material support of the regional powers of the Islamic belt.

In Pakistani society at this stage is clearly seen the fatigue and depression, which the social psychologists identify as "frustration". It is caused by the unprecedented scale of acts of terrorism and violence. Most of all, the terrorist acts are conducted in the Pakistani-Afghan border area (the Pashtun and Baluchi areas) and the country's metropolis – the multi-million city of Karachi. In terms of the number of civilian casualties, Pakistan in the period after 2001 surpassed Afghanistan and is in in this regard one of the most dangerous places in the world. This provokes a protest of civil society, formed in many respects anew, under the influence of Western human rights organizations and movements. The ideological and political struggle among the Pakistani public is being built around the conflict between the values of radical Islamism, moderate Islam and liberalism. A state ruled by a civilian government that came to power following the 2013 and 2018 parliamentary elections is trying to rely on a synthesis of Islamic and liberal ideas, pursuing a generally pro-Western foreign policy, but with an eye to the special ties linking it with Saudi Arabia and China. It seems that protest moods in the



foreseeable future will hardly be able to shake the order of things that has developed in Pakistan. This can happen only in the course of the unforeseen external geopolitical or environment changes, either regional or global.

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